




# Monitor Synthesis: for software health management

Lee Pike [leepike@galois.com](mailto:leepike@galois.com)

Alwyn Goodloe [alwyn.goodloe@nianet.org](mailto:alwyn.goodloe@nianet.org)

César Muñoz [munoz@nianet.org](mailto:munoz@nianet.org)

# Where Are We?



# Who Are We?

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- Galois, Inc.
  - Galois' mission is to create **trustworthiness in critical systems**. We're in the business of **taking blue-sky ideas** and turning them **into real-world technology solutions**.
  - About 40 employees, including experts in **functional programming**, **formal methods**, and **security**.
- National Institute of Aerospace (NIA)
  - NIA is a non-profit research and graduate education institute created to conduct leading-edge **aerospace** and **atmospheric research** and **develop new technologies** for the nation.
  - Includes the **NIA Formal Methods Group**, working on critical systems of interest to NASA.

# Project Staff

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- Lee Pike, Galois (PI)
- César Muñoz, NIA (Co-PI)
- Alwyn Goodloe, NIA (Research Scientist)
  
- Consultants:
  - Joe Hurd, Galois
  - John Matthews, Galois

# Software Health Management

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- What is **software health** for embedded control systems?
  - Functional correctness
  - Timing properties
  - Safety properties (capturing fault-tolerance)Under the environmental assumptions.
- Problem:
  - **testing** cannot ensure the absence of errors in ultra-reliable systems,
  - and **formal proof** does not yet scale.
- So “who watches the watchmen?”

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# Software Monitoring

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- *Simplicity is the unavoidable price which we must pay for reliability.* —C.A.R. Hoare
- Simple **monitors** analyze executions at **runtime** for software health.
- Monitors **raise alarms** or attempt to **reset** the system (into a known safe state).
- **Research question:** can **software monitoring** form a basis of **software health management**?


# Research Contributions to IVHM

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- Our research hypothesis: we can **synthesize** software monitors for *ultra-reliable systems* that are **distributed**, **fault-tolerant**, **hard real-time**.
- Our research challenges:
  - Distributed systems may require **distributed monitoring** (diagnosis without global information).
  - Monitors should not jeopardize hard **real-time requirements** of the monitored systems.
  - Monitors *themselves* need to be **reliable**, perhaps requiring **fault-tolerance**.
  - **Formally** synthesizing these monitors from requirements.

# Key Research Contributions

- **Approach:**
  - Formal synthesis of fault-tolerant monitors from system specifications.
- **Systems characterization:**
  - Hard real-time
  - Fault-tolerant
  - “Small graphs”
  - “Fixed topology”
- **Properties to monitor:**
  - Validity
  - Agreement
  - Timing constraints



# Proposed Monitoring Case Studies

- NASA's *SPIDER* (Scalable Process-Independent Design for Enhanced Reliability)
  - An ultra-reliable databus designed and prototyped by the NASA Langley Safety-Critical Avionics Systems Branch.
  - Formally specified and verified fault-tolerant protocols.
- TTech's *TTEthernet*
  - Allows hard real-time communication and services over ethernet.
  - Formally specified properties.



# Proposed Plan of Work

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- Year 1
  - Survey state-of-the-art approaches to software health management.
  - Research monitors for **hard real-time** temporal constraints.
  - Research **synthesis framework**.
- Year 2
  - Develop **synthesis framework**.
  - Design monitors for timing properties, agreement, and validity for our case studies.
- Year 3
  - Develop monitors for our case studies.
  - Research the synthesis of **fault-tolerant monitors**.